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Heinzelmann, N. (2023): Weakness of will and delay discounting, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Heinzelmann, N. (2024): Advances in neurophilosophy, London: Bloomsbury.

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Heinzelmann, N. (2022): Rationality is not coherence, The Philosophical Quarterly.
Heinzelmann, N., & Tran, V. (2022): Extremists are more confident, Erkenntnis.
Küchenhoff, S., Doerflinger, J. & Heinzelmann, N. (2022): The Genetic Technologies Questionnaire: Lay judgments about genetic technologies align with ethical theory, are coherent, and predict behaviour, BMC Medical Ethics 23:54.
Heinzelmann, N. & Hartmann, S. (2022): Disagreement and confidence change, Synthese 200: 1Ð13.
Heinzelmann, N. (2021a): Compensation and moral luck, The Monist 104: 251Ð64.
Heinzelmann, N., Höltgen, B. & Tran, V. (2021): Moral disagreement boosts confidence in moral judgements, Philosophical Psychology 34.
Heinzelmann, N. (2020): Conflicting judgments and weakness of will, Philosophia 49: 255-69
Heinzelmann, N., Weber, S., & Tobler, P. (2020): Aesthetics and morality judgments share cortical neuroarchitecture, Cortex 129: 484Ð95.
Heinzelmann, N. (2018a): Deontology defended, Synthese 195(12): 5197Ð216.
Heinzelmann, N., Ugazio, G., & Tobler, P. (2012): Practical implications of empirically studying moral decision-making, Frontiers in Neuroscience 6(94): 1Ð14.

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Heinzelmann (forthcoming): Review of Hossein Dabbagh’s The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism, Philosophical Psychology

Heinzelmann, N. (2024): Précis von Weakness of will and delay discounting (Precis of Weakness of will and delay discounting) and Repliken auf Patricia Rich und Philipp Brüllmann (Replies to Patricia Rich and Philipp Brüllmann), Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 78 (2)

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